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the American defenses, one must anticipate a devastating nuclear reply. This
strategic fact is bound to affect anyone
who is not merely suicidal. Therefore, on
the prospect that the defense might work
well enough, and given the certainty of a
powerful response, a nonsuicidal enemy
will have considerable hesitation about
attacking. That hesitation is increased—it
is in no way decreased—by an in-place
ballistic-missile defense. As a consequence, strategically speaking, the issue
of “perfect” defense is a phony one.
Moreover, the author shows no understanding whatsoever of the power of separate layers of defense. The fact that a
three-tiered defense in which each tier
has 80 percent effectiveness has an overall system effectiveness in excess of 99
percent goes completely unremarked.
Also, much is made here of the notion
that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
sought to make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” This is closely related
in the book to the ridiculous notion of
“perfect” defenses. In his speech of 23
March 1983, however, President Reagan
called upon the scientific community to
“give us the means of rendering those
nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”
The strategic argument—that it is when
one is convinced that an attack could not
succeed that those weapons become “impotent and obsolete”—has totally escaped
FitzGerald.
Most serious, however, is the failure of
FitzGerald to understand that the Reagan
administration set out deliberately to return, after the debacle of the Carter administration, to an active containment of
Soviet imperialism and to accelerate the
erosion of the Soviet system from within.
The SDI was part of this overall strategy,
which was set forth in National Security
Decision Directive 75, dated 17 January
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1983, entitled “U.S. Relations with the
USSR.” Although this document—originally classified “Secret Sensitive”—was
declassified and released in 1994, the
book makes no mention of it. Clearly this
information was available to FitzGerald,
and one is left to speculate as to reasons
for its absence. Perhaps it is because
NSDD-75 says clearly that the United
States “should continue to resist Soviet
efforts to return to a U.S.-Soviet agenda
focused primarily on arms control.”
That, of course, offends the very essence
of Way Out There in the Blue.
ROGER W. BARNETT

Professor Emeritus
Naval War College

Russian General Staff. The Soviet-Afghan War:
How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Edited by Lester
W. Grau, translated by Michael A. Gress. Lawrence:
Univ. Press of Kansas, 2002. 364pp. $45

This book, edited by Lester Grau of the
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the last of a
trilogy that covers the Soviet-Afghan War
of 1979–89. His translator, Michael
Gress, served in the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. Volume 1, The Bear Went over
the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in
Afghanistan, was an early translation of
original Russian documents prepared by
student-officers—who had direct combat
experience in Afghanistan—at the Frunze
Military Academy in Moscow. It was first
published in Russian in 1991, then republished in English in 1996 by the National Defense University. For the second
volume, The Other Side of the Mountain:
Mujahedeen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan
War (1996, U.S. Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, Quantico, Va.),
Grau had the valuable assistance of Ali
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Jalali, a former colonel in the Afghan
army.
The third volume was written by a team
of Russian military academicians led by
Colonel Professor Valentin Runov, with
contributions from officers who had
served during the war. It is a systematic
critical analysis from the perspective of the
Russian General Staff, providing a significant amount of information regarding
the type of conflict the Soviets faced in
Chechnya and Central Asia. It describes
how the relatively high-technology Soviet
troops fought in a protracted war of attrition with a low-technology, ill-disciplined,
but highly motivated guerrilla force until
the Soviets were forced to withdraw. In
contrast to volume 1, on Soviet combat
tactics in Afghanistan, this volume provides an in-depth analysis of how different branches of the Red Army interacted
and fought in specific raids and ambushes.
When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan
in 1979, they applied textbook techniques
for launching a mass linear blitzkrieg attack against Nato forces in Europe. However, they found these techniques of little
use against the Afghans and switched to
nonlinear tactics, increasing their use of
high-precision weapons, which are better
suited to the treacherous mountainous
terrain. Grau describes well the three visible tactical improvements that the Soviets
applied in the field: the combined-arms
brigade; the materiel support battalion;
and the smallest units, bronegruppy, consisting of three to five tracked or wheeled
armored vehicles. There are also discussions on the role of the Spetsnaz, the special reconnaissance and commando units,
and air assault techniques using helicopters, which were widely employed until
the Afghans began effectively using
Stinger missiles.
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Although the Soviet-Afghan war has often been compared with the U.S. war in
Vietnam, it was very different. While
American strength rose to over 500,000
troops, who were employed in sizable operations, the Soviet “Limited Contingent”
(its official title) varied from 90,000 to
120,000 troops, packed into the Fortieth
Army’s four divisions, five separate brigades, three separate regiments, and
smaller support units, which were
stretched to the limit to provide protection to more than thirty provincial centers and industrial installations. Moreover,
up to 20 percent of its strength went to
man over 860 picket posts throughout
the country, and much combat strength
was further drained by convoy duties.
In spite of valuable critical comments
provided by the American editors at the
end of each chapter, some important aspects of the war are hardly discussed.
Only four pages are devoted to the role of
loyal Afghan (Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan) forces, which were about the
same size as the Soviet Fortieth Army. We
learn almost nothing about the special
DRA Ministry of the Interior troops
(Sarandoy), the military units of KHAD,
the dreaded Afghan secret police, or the
panoply of tribal militias intermittently
cooperating with the Soviets against the
guerrillas.
However, one should appreciate the revelations found in this book, such as the
correct number of Soviet casualties since
the 1979 invasion. Despite Mikhail
Gorbachev’s trumpeted glasnost, his official number of 13,833 dead was apparently about half the actual number. The
third volume also confirms earlier findings that, in spite of the systematic penetration of the military and administrative
infrastructure of Afghanistan prior to the
invasion, Soviet intelligence—especially
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when trying to penetrate the
Mujahedeen—was very poor.
Even with the shortcomings mentioned,
this volume must be rated as one of the
best in providing a systematic analysis of
the Soviet armed forces on the tactical
level. In addition to twenty photographs
of soldiers and their weapons, there are
about thirty maps illustrating various
tactical operations. The translation from
Russian to English is excellent. The book
will be indispensable to students of military tactics, as well as area specialists, as
its lessons continue to be pertinent to
conflict in Central Asia.
MILAN HAUNER

University of Wisconsin–Madison

Connaughton, Richard. MacArthur and Defeat in
the Philippines. New York: Overlook Press, 2001.
394pp. $35

In the dark days following the onset of
the Pacific War, American military successes were few and far between. The gallant, albeit unsuccessful, defense of the
Philippines, however, captured the national spirit and made General Douglas
A. MacArthur a national hero. His triumphant return to Manila three years later
seemed to confirm his status as a commander of extraordinary military genius. Largely forgotten was his abortive
defense of the archipelago in 1941 that
ultimately led to the surrender of the
largest number of American troops in
history. In his prequel to The Battle for
Manila, British author Richard
Connaughton examines MacArthur’s
early campaigns and concludes that his
subject was a courageous general but a
deeply flawed man.
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Connaughton begins his story with a
brief narrative outlining America’s involvement in the Philippines since the
1880s, the same decade that witnessed
MacArthur’s birth. Switching gears, he
then follows MacArthur’s career from his
graduation from West Point in 1903
through his multiple tours in the Philippines. Connaughton pays special attention to his subject’s activities in the years
immediately preceding World War II,
when MacArthur held the rank of field
marshal of the Philippine Commonwealth. The MacArthur who emerges
during this period was the kind of military planner whose strategic vision was
based on the enemy’s presumed intentions rather than the foe’s capabilities.
When the Japanese attacked in December
1941, MacArthur’s defensive plans proved
hollow. Connaughton severely criticizes
MacArthur for allowing the destruction
of his air force on the ground at Clark
Field and speculates that MacArthur,
alone of the other senior Allied commanders who suffered defeat in the first
days of the war, was not sacked but promoted to the temporary rank of general
because he was “untouchable both politically and militarily.” In his assessment of
MacArthur, Connaughton joins a growing number of historians who find fault
with the “Far Eastern General.”
Nor is Connaughton laudatory about
MacArthur’s static defense of Lingayen
Gulf, which he characterizes as “among
the most lackluster, uninspiring defenses
conducted throughout the duration of
World War II.” Within a week of the
Japanese amphibious assault at Lingayen
Gulf, MacArthur declared Manila an
open city and withdrew the majority of
his forces to the Bataan Peninsula and
the island fortress of Corregidor. Unfortunately the garrison was ill equipped,
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